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Colloquy 
To Recall or Not to Recall, That Is the Question: 
The Current Controversy over Medical Device 
Recalls 
Ralph F. Hall* 
All things are difficult before they are easy. 
- Thomas Fuller 
 
INTRODUCTION 
At the age of seventeen, Joshua Oukrop learned that he 
suffered from a serious heart condition.1  As a result of this 
condition, Mr. Oukrop received a Guidant Prizm 2® 
implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD). 
The ICD treats a condition known as Sudden Cardiac 
Death (SCD).  SCD is an electrical malfunction of the heart.  
Unless treated, SCD can cause death within seconds.  With an 
ICD, the patient has an excellent chance of surviving an SCD 
episode.  The ICD compresses the cardiac resuscitation 
equipment of an emergency room into a device the size of a 
deck of cards.  To do so, the ICD must miniaturize the 
functionality of a desktop computer, operate for multiple years 
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 1. Maura Lerner, Hunting Down Dangers to the Heart, STAR TRIB., July 
24, 2005, at 1A. 
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on the power equivalent of several AA batteries, and deliver 
750-volt shocks on seconds’ notice all while performing in a 
hostile environment with reliability requirements that match 
or exceed those of NASA.  It is no wonder that, along with 
Thomas Edison and Alexander Graham Bell, the inventors of 
the ICD have been inducted into the National Inventors Hall of 
Fame.2 
In March 2005, Mr. Oukrop was cycling in Utah when he 
experienced an episode of SCD and required therapy from the 
ICD.  Unbeknownst to him, his ICD suffered from an internal 
short circuit that prevented the device from delivering the 
lifesaving therapy when needed.  Miles from any help, he 
passed away.  His physicians have stated that had they known 
of the risk of this short circuit, they may well have replaced his 
device before this tragic event.3 
It was subsequently disclosed that Guidant had received 
approximately twenty-five reports of similar malfunctions out 
of 24,000 Prizm 2 devices prior to the malfunction of Mr. 
Oukrop’s ICD.4  Aware of only several reports at the time, 
Guidant changed its manufacturing processes in April 2002 to 
reduce the short circuit risk.5  It continued to sell ICDs 
manufactured using the older process while it phased in the 
newer version. 
Until this information regarding prior device failures was 
about to become public in a New York Times article,6 Guidant 
had not notified physicians or patients of these failures or the 
manufacturing changes.  Guidant justified its decision to 
continue selling these devices and not notify physicians on the 
grounds that the overall failure rate of the device, even 
including these events, is extremely low (and less than the 
company’s internal notification trigger) and because the device 
                                                          
 2. The National Inventors Hall of Fame recognized Michael Mirowski, 
Morton Mower, M. Stephen Heilman, and Alois Langer in 2002 for the 
invention of the ICD.  For further information, see 
http://www.invent.org/hall_of_fame/1_1_search.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 
2005). 
 3. Barry Meier, Maker of Heart Device Kept Flaw from Doctors, N.Y.  
Times, May 24, 2005. 
       4.  Press Release, Guidant, Guidant Notifies Physicians Regarding 
VENTAK 1861 PRIZM 2 DR Implantable Defibrillator (May 25, 2005), 
www.guidant.com/news/500/web_release/nr_000546.shtml. This reflects an 
incidence rate of approximately 0.107%. 
 5.    Id.   
 6. Id. 
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was performing better than its design specifications.7  In 
addition, Guidant concluded that the risk of explanting the 
device was greater than the risk of device malfunction.  On 
May 23, 2005, the day before the New York Times article was 
to be published, Guidant commenced a physician notification of 
this potential malfunction.8  Over the next four months 
Guidant announced a series of additional physician 
notifications covering a significant number of similar products.9 
A media frenzy erupted.  Articles in the New York Times,10 
Journal of the American Medical Association,11 and the New 
England Journal of Medicine,12 among others, debated these 
issues and criticized Guidant’s decisions.  Patient groups were 
highly critical.13  The debate focused on how manufacturers 
should handle low-frequency device malfunctions and when the 
public should be notified of possible device defects issues (in 
other words, what should “trigger” public notification of device 
                                                          
 7.    Id. 
 8. Press Release, Guidant, Guidant Notifies Physicians Regarding 
VENTAK 1861 PRIZM 2 DR Implantable Defibrillator (May 25, 2005), 
www.guidant.com/news/500/web_release/nr_000546.shtml. 
 9. Press Release, Guidant, Guidant Initiates Voluntary Physician 
Advisory on Certain Pacemakers (Sept. 22, 2005) 
http://www.guidant.com/news/500/web_release/nr_000576.shtml; Press 
Release, Guidant, Guidant Updates Corrective Actions Regarding Its 
VENTAK PRIZM AVT, VITALITY AVT, and CONTAK RENEWAL AVT 
Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators (July 22, 2005) 
http://www.guidant.com/news/500/web_release/nr_000561.shtml; Press 
Release, Guidant, Guidant Initiates Worldwide Physician Communications 
Regarding Important Safety Information and Corrective Action About Certain 
Pacemakers (July 18, 2005), 
http://www.guidant.com/news/500/web_release/nr_000558.shtml; Press 
Release, Guidant, Guidant Initiates Worldwide Physician Communications 
Regarding Important Safety Information and Corrective Action About 
Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators (June 24, 2005), 
http://www.guidant.com/news/500/web_release/nr_000554.shtml; Press 
Release, Guidant, Guidant Initiates Worldwide Physician Communications 
Regarding Important Safety Information and Corrective Action About 
Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators (June 17, 2005), 
http://www.guidant.com/news/500/web_release/nr_000548.shtml.  
 10. See Meier, supra note 3. 
 11. See, e.g., William H. Maisel, Safety Issues Involving Medical Devices, 
294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 955 (2005). 
 12. See, e.g., Robert Steinbrook, The Controversy over Guidant’s 
Implantable Defibrillators, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 221 (2005). 
 13. See, e.g., Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy Ass’n, Device Recalls and 
Alerts, www.4hcm.org/WCMS/index.php?id=46,149,0,0,1,0 (last visited 
November 21, 2005) (“In the case of the Guidant’s Prizm 2 models there is no 
excuse to have withheld information of potential flaws in the device . . . .”).   
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issues).  At what point should the manufacturer make a 
disclosure?  To whom should the disclosure be made?  How 
should the disclosure be published?  What role should the 
physician play? 
A sad but undeniable reality is that no matter how far we 
progress, all medical devices can fail or malfunction.  So while 
devices such as the ICD have the power to save thousands, if 
not millions, of lives, a device failure can have tragic results for 
those whose lives depend upon it. 
Events such as the death of Mr. Oukrop have focused 
intense attention on device malfunctions and the process of 
notifying the physician of these issues.  In this ongoing debate, 
many stakeholders have been openly critical of how physicians, 
FDA, and, in particular, industry have handled decisions 
regarding recalls of products evidencing some risk of 
malfunction.  Many assert that industry should be more open 
in disclosing even low-frequency or low-risk malfunction 
trends. 
The debate revolves around one key policy question: What 
should happen when the manufacturer learns that a marketed 
implantable device is at risk of some, usually previously 
unknown, malfunction?  Who gets told what, when, and by 
whom? 
One cannot underscore the importance and complexity of 
this debate.  In fact, these events led the Heart Rhythm Society 
(HRS) and FDA to come together to cosponsor a policy 
conference to address these issues.  The conference, held on 
September 16, 2005, brought together physicians, industry, 
government, academics, and patients.  A series of formal 
presentations, speaker panels, and open discussion sought to 
identify and frame the issues surrounding device malfunction 
notification. 14  While the conference did not resolve the issues, 
it did create the groundwork for future discussions and led to 
the HRS’s creation of a task force to address the problems. 
Others stakeholders, from patients to industry, are also 
contributing to this debate and the search for a solution.  
                                                          
 14. The HRS is the medical society of electrophysiologists, cardiologists, 
and affiliated specialists who research and treat cardiac arrhythmias, often 
with devices such as ICDs and pacemakers.  For information on the 
proceedings of this policy conference, see Heart Rhythm Society & FDA, 
Proceedings Document from the Policy Conference on Pacemaker and ICD 
Performance (Sept. 16, 2005) [hereinafter Proceedings], available at 
http://www.hrsonline.org/advocacyDocs/HRS-device_conference.pdf.   
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Guidant itself has created an independent task force to help 
answer these questions. 
There is a consensus that the current system must change 
and improve.  There is no agreement on what those changes 
should be.  Exactly what these changes will be remains an open 
question—a question this colloquy seeks to help answer. 
The articles that follow, many of which have their origin in 
the recent HRS policy conference, are intended to help identify 
the problems, and more importantly, the goals or objectives 
that any solutions to this difficult question must satisfy.  In 
order to do so, several key stakeholders—FDA, physicians, and 
bioethicists—have provided their thoughts and 
recommendations on this issue.  Patients15 and industry16 have 
also expressed their views.  The commentary following these 
articles seeks to find the common ground, discuss the points of 
contention, and recommend a solution that satisfies the 
stakeholders’ objectives. 
FDA REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES: 
The FDA regulates all medical devices under a complex 
scheme of overlapping requirements.17  While it is impossible to 
address each of the multitude of requirements here, to 
understand the recall system and its issues, one must first 
understand three other key FDA regulatory processes: the 
approval process, device performance monitoring, and event 
reporting obligations. 
THE APPROVAL PROCESS 
The FDA approval process varies depending on the nature, 
and particularly the degree of risk, of the medical device.18  For 
example, ICDs are Class III medical devices, the classification 
reserved for the highest risk devices.  As such, an ICD cannot 
be legally marketed in the United States unless FDA has 
approved a Premarket Approval application (PMA).19  The PMA 
application includes indications (or uses for the product), 
                                                          
 15. Lisa Salberg, Heart Rythm [sic] Society and the FDA Hold Policy 
Conference on Pacemaker and ICD Performance, HEART LINK ONLINE, Oct. 7, 
2005, www.enewsbuilder.net/hypertrophic/e_article000468321.cfm?x=b11,0,w. 
 16. See, e.g., Proceedings, supra note 14. 
 17. For the FDA’s statutory authority to regulate medical devices, see 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (2000). 
 18. 21 U.S.C. § 360c. 
 19.   21 U.S.C. § 360e. 
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warnings and contraindications, product labeling, clinical trial 
results, and information on manufacturing processes.20  The 
PMA process allows FDA to assess the risk and benefits of the 
device and to determine the appropriate uses for the device.21  
The final approved product labeling22 discloses risks, warnings 
and contraindications associated with the device.23  Products 
such as ICDs can only be prescribed by a physician. 
A company must seek FDA approval before it can make a 
modification in a PMA device that affects the safety or efficacy 
of the device.  To do so, the company must file a Supplemental 
Premarket Approval application (SPMA), setting forth the 
details and implications of the proposed change.24  Not all 
changes require prior FDA approval, however.  If a company 
changes a device in a way that does not affect the safety or 
efficacy of the device, the company may simply notify the FDA 
of the change after the fact through an “annual report.”25  
Generally, changes intended to improve yields or ease 
manufacturing are reported through this annual report 
process. 
DEVICE PERFORMANCE MONITORING 
Because of the critical nature of these medical devices, 
manufacturers must have substantial quality systems in 
place.26  As part of the company’s quality system, the 
manufacturer must monitor the field performance of its 
                                                          
 20. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c); 21 C.F.R. pt. 814 (2005) (providing overview of 
the PMA process). 
 21. 21 C.F.R. § 860.7 (2005). 
 22. “Labeling” is defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2000).  Labeling includes 
much more than simply the printing on the product box or container.  For 
example, “labeling” includes physician manuals. 
 23. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c) (2000) (requiring application for premarket 
approval to include specimens of proposed labeling for the device); 21 C.F.R. § 
814.82 (2005) (requiring “prominent display in the labeling of a device and in 
the advertising of any restricted device of warnings, hazards, or precautions 
important for the device’s safe and effective use”); 21 C.F.R. § 860.7 (2005). 
 24. 21 C.F.R. § 814.39 (2005). 
     25.   Id. 
 26. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j (2000) (setting forth the statutory requirements 
for a medical device manufacturer’s quality system).  The implementing 
quality system requirements in 21 C.F.R. pt. 820 include quality requirements 
for processes ranging from product design through manufacturing to 
distribution.  The overarching management responsibilities for the 
effectiveness of the quality system are set forth in 21 C.F.R. § 820.20 (2005).  
The quality systems of most medical device manufacturers are also certified to 
the requirements in ISO 9001 or ISO 13485. 
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devices, including any malfunctions (a process often referred to 
as “surveillance”).  The manufacturer must investigate any 
report of a device malfunction, determine root cause of the 
problem, if possible, and take necessary corrective actions.27  
These surveillance and corrective actions also help the 
company.  By determining the root cause of a malfunction, the 
company is able to learn from past events and improve the 
performance of future generations of products. 
REPORTING 
In addition to the duty to conduct product surveillance28 
and identify and correct problems, FDA requires 
manufacturers to report adverse events to FDA in the form of 
Medical Device Reports (MDRs).29  MDRs detail any deaths, 
serious injuries, or malfunctions known or reported to the 
manufacturer that may be associated with a particular 
device.30  Reports from physicians about patient events or from 
internally generated information and analysis can trigger 
MDRs.  The reports must often be submitted before the 
completion of any factual or technical investigation.  The public 
may access the reports through the Manufacturer and User 
Facility Device Experience (MAUDE) database.31 
The manufacturer is not the only source of information to 
FDA.  Device users such as hospitals, physicians, or other 
health care providers can also submit MDR reports directly to 
FDA.32  Medical literature also provides information about 
device performance. 
Once it receives an MDR report, FDA enters it on the 
MAUDE database.  This database is open to the public, 
enabling both the physician and patient to monitor their 
particular device’s performance.  The MAUDE database is 
intended to facilitate physicians, researchers, or the public in 
                                                          
 27. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 820.100 (2005). 
 28. See 21 U.S.C. § 360l (2000) (providing FDA’s authority for mandating 
post approval requirements including surveillance); 21 C.F.R. pt. 814 subpart 
E (2005) (same). 
 29. 21 U.S.C. § 360i (2000); 21 C.F.R. pt. 803 (2005). 
 30. 21 C.F.R. § 803.1. 
 31.   To conduct a search of the MAUDE database, see 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfMAUDE/search.cfm (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2005).     
 32. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 803.30 (describing MDR filing obligations of user 
facilities). 
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finding product malfunctions or adverse events, identifying 
trends, or otherwise advancing public health. 
In addition to the MAUDE database, there are a number of 
public and private active surveillance systems.  Rather than 
relying on the physician to voluntarily report field events as in 
a passive surveillance system such as the MDR process, an 
active surveillance system affirmatively collects data from a 
predetermined set of hospitals or physicians.  Active 
surveillance systems such as MedSun33 collect information both 
on actual malfunctions (the “numerator”) and on total device 
experience (the “denominator”) in order to ascertain overall 
device performance and the risk of malfunction. 
FIELD ACTIONS OR RECALLS 
The manufacturer also must notify physicians of certain 
types of product malfunctions or failures to meet product 
specifications.  Currently, manufacturers may commence a 
product recall when the device fails to meet some material 
specification, is violative, or poses some unreasonable risk to 
public health.34  The recall process uses information gathered 
through the various surveillance systems and quality system 
requirements discussed above.  The notification process is 
comprised of three distinct tasks or systems: 
1) the event reporting and analysis process, including the 
MDR reporting process described above, in which information 
about actual or potential malfunctions is collected and 
analyzed; 
2) the process to decide whether to “trigger” a recall or 
product safety alert35 and notify physicians about a specific 
issue; and 
3) the process for implementing and communicating the 
recall information to physicians. 
If the manufacturer concludes that some field action such 
as a recall (or a “correction” or “removal” action in FDA 
parlance), is needed, then the manufacturer must inform the 
FDA of the recall, the reasons for the recall, and the plan for 
                                                          
 33.   See MedSun, https://www.medsun.net/about.html (last visited Nov. 21, 
2005).   
 34. 21 C.F.R. § 7.40 (2005). 
 35. For purposes of this discussion, the term "notification" or “safety alert” 
will generally be used to denote the process in which physicians are informed 
of device malfunction issues.  Today, these actions are generally called 
“recalls.”  As discussed later, this term is confusing and should be modified. 
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conducting the recall.36  As part of this process, the 
manufacturer generally notifies the physicians treating 
affected patients about the device issue.  In certain recalls, the 
company will also issue a press release both to better inform 
physicians and patients about the situation and to satisfy SEC 
requirements. 
The FDA classifies the recall into one of three categories 
based on the level of risk to the public, with Class I recalls 
being those events which pose the greatest risk.37  Due to the 
level of risk, the FDA generally issues its own press release for 
all Class I recalls.  In addition, the FDA posts recall 
information on its website, no matter the class or risk posed.  
At the end of a field action, FDA often assesses the 
effectiveness of the recall.38 
In addition to recall notifications, ICD manufacturers 
provide device performance information to the user both in the 
physician’s manual and in product performance reports that 
are generally prepared yearly and made public.  These reports 
are not required and not all device manufacturers issue these 
voluntary product performance reports.  While a number of 
factors are considered in deciding whether to issue a product 
performance report, these reports tend to be produced for more 
complex and lifesaving products.39 
Once a recall is triggered, the physician must work with 
the patient in determining the proper course of action. 
Historically, physicians have taken the relevant information 
and communicated with their patients, working together to 
make decisions that best address the needs of the individual 
patient. 
                                                          
 36. 21 C.F.R. § 7.46 (2005); 21 C.F.R. pt. 806 (2005).   FDA also has the 
authority to mandate a notification to health care providers regarding a device 
that “presents an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public health”; 
however, this authority is almost never used.  See 21 U.S.C. § 360h(a) (2000). 
 37. 21 C.F.R. § 7.41 (2005). 
 38. 21 C.F.R. § 7.42 (2005). 
 39. For examples of ICD product performance reports, see  Medtronic, 
Cardiac Rhythm Management, Product Performance Report 2005, 
www.medtronic.com/crm/performance/index.html; Guidant, Product 
Performance Report 2005, 
www.guidant.com/physician/product_performance_report.pdf; and St. Jude 
Medical, Product Performance Report 2005, 
www.sjm.com/documents/productperfreport.pdf. 
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SUMMARY 
While the regulatory scheme governing medical devices is 
complex, the pertinent regulations relating to device approval, 
device monitoring, and product safety reporting are integral to 
the system for notifying physicians of device malfunctions.  In 
each step, the manufacturer plays a pivotal role in providing 
the relevant information to both doctors and patients.  Rather 
than monitoring the actual devices themselves, the FDA 
reviews the manufacturer’s quality system and product 
malfunction data and reports and routinely inspects the 
manufacturers to ensure compliance with the various 
requirements. 
THE ISSUES 
With this background, one can understand the following 
articles and how the death of Mr. Oukrop raised a number of 
serious questions including: 
? Are there adequate product performance 
surveillance systems? 
? How should the system identify and respond to 
very low frequency events that could have very 
serious ramifications? 
? What is the standard or “trigger” by which one 
decides whether to inform physicians of product 
performance issues? 
? Is there a conflict of interest in having industry 
investigate product issues and (usually) making 
the decision as to whether to trigger a recall? 
? What are the proper roles for FDA, industry and 
physicians? 
? How should patients be informed of device issues 
and by whom? 
This colloquy seeks to address these issues and offer some 
ideas for improvement. 
 
